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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION/NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction of this appeal 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(j). 
The appellants (Atkinsons) filed a lawsuit July 26, 
1987 against IHC Hospitals, Inc. (IHC), Scott Wetzel Services, 
Inc. (Wetzel) and Scott Olsen, claiming fraud or negligent 
misrepresentation as to a settlement agreement reached in 
connection with injuries sustained by Chad Atkinson while he was 
a patient at Primary Children's Medical Center. The heart of 
the complaint is that the settlement agreement is not worth 
three million dollars as was allegedly negotiated, and that the 
settlement agreement was only entered into by the Atkinsons 
because the "defendants" said that Chad Atkinson, the brain 
damaged child, was going to be normal. 
The Atkinsons also sued Steven G. Morgan and the law 
firm of Morgan, Scalley & Reading for legal malpractice. 
The district court granted summary judgment as to all 
defendants. The court also denied the Atkinsons1 motion to file 
an amended complaint. 
This is an appeal from the district court's granting 
of summary judgment as to all defendants and denying the 
Atkinsons1 motion to amend the complaint. 
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STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
The issues presented for review as to IHC are as 
follows: 
1. Whether the lower court properly granted summary 
judgment to IHC by dismissing the Atkinsons1 complaint? 
2. Whether the plaintiffs1 signed release of all 
claims bars the present claims against IHC for fraud and 
negligent misrepresentation? 
3. Whether the medical malpractice statute of 
limitations or the fraud statute of limitations bars the claims 
against IHC? 
4. Whether the probate court-approved settlement 
collaterally estops the plaintiffs1 claims for fraud and 
negligent misrepresentation? 
5. Whether the plaintiffs' request for a declaratory 
judgment was properly denied where there was no justiciable 
controversy? 
6. Whether the district court abused its discretion 
in denying the motion to amend the complaint? 
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TEXT OF AUTHORITIES 
Statute of limitations for fraud or mistake; 
Within three years: 
(3) an action for relief on the ground of 
fraud or mistake; except that the cause of 
action in such case does not accrue until the 
discovery by the aggrieved party of the facts 
constituting fraud or mistake. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-26(3). 
Utah Health Care Malpractice Act provisions^ 
Definition of terms as used in this Act: 
(29) "Malpractice action against a health 
care provider" means any action against a 
health care provider, whether in contract, 
tort, breach of warranty, wrongful death or 
otherwise, based upon alleged personal 
injuries relating to or arising out of health 
care rendered or which should have been 
rendered by the health care provider. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-3(29). 
Statute of Limitations—Excepti qns - -^Application. 
(1) No malpractice action against a health 
care provider may be brought unless it is 
commenced within two years after the plaintiff 
or patient discovers, or through the use of 
reasonable diligence should have discovered 
the injury, which ever first occurs, but not 
to exceed four years after the date of the 
alleged act, omission, neglect or occurrence, 
except that: 
(b) In an action where it is 
alleged that a patient has been 
- 3 -
prevented from discovering 
misconduct on the part of a 
health care provider because the 
health care provider has 
affirmatively acted to 
fraudulently conceal the alleged 
misconduct, the claim shall be 
barred unless commenced within 
one year after the plaintiff or 
patient discovers, or through the 
use of reasonable diligence, 
should have discovered the 
fraudulent concealment, whichever 
first occurs. 
(2) The provisions of this section shall 
apply to all persons, regardless of minority 
or other legal disability under § 78-12-36 or 
any other provision of the law. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-4(1), (2). 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The Atkinsons1 minor son, Chad Atkinson, suffered 
brain damage after he aspirated while a patient a+~ Primary 
Children's Medical Center on ^arrn 4. )9H . * . :..5 
entered into a settlement agreement which they now claim is 
inadequate. 
The Atkinsons specifically claim that IHC, its 
adjuster Wetzel, and Wetzel/s employee, Scott Olsen, are guilty 
o£ f raud and neg J i y e 11 t mi s i;epresen ta 11 <in i fi connection with 
obtaining the settlement with the Atkinsons. 
IHC, through its agent, Wetzel, retained Steven G. 
Morgan for the purpose of presenting the settlement agr eement to 
the Third Judicial District Court. The Atkinsons now claim that 
Morgan was their attorney and that he committed legal 
malpractice. 
The Atkinsons also sought declaratory relief, asking 
the court to constr u* a i >< >r tion of the settlement agreement and 
determine whether it inr Ludes institutional care and custodial 
living costs for Chad Atkinson. 
IHC fll e< I : ' >i i to dismiss after the complaint was 
served. By agreement •" counsel, the motion was not noticed up 
for hearing unti1 after discovery pertinent to f'he issues had 
been completed IHC then moved for summary judgment. The 
-.
:
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motion for summary judgment was granted. (R. at 590-593.) 
Morgan and the law firm also filed a motion for summary 
judgment, as did Wetzel and Olsen. Their motions were granted. 
(Rc at 430-432, 590-593.) 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In addition to the facts set forth in the Brief of 
Respondents (Morgan), the Court should be aware of the following: 
1. The plaintiffs Roger and Polly Atkinson sought 
appointment as conservators and guardians of Chad Atkinson to 
enable them to settle Chad Atkinson's claims against Primary 
Children's Medical Center. Appointment was granted July 26, 
1983. (R. at 644, Exhibit 8.) 
2. The Court-approved appointment of Roger and Polly 
Atkinson and approval of the settlement agreement followed at 
least five separate meetings directly involving Roger and Polly 
Atkinson, Roger's father, a Primary Children's Medical Center 
administrator, and Scott Olsen. (R. at 653, pp. 31-50.) The 
end result of the negotiations was a complete financial package 
covering Chad Atkinson's medical care, education and investment 
protection, with additional money going to Roger and Polly 
Atkinson for their inconvenience. (R„ at 644, Exhibit 7.) 
3. Roger and Polly Atkinson, with parental support, 
actively participated in negotiating a settlement. By May 27, 
1983, Primary Children's Medical Center had admitted it felt 
responsible for Chad's condition. (See complaint at 1F 16; R. at 
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2-19.) Scott Olsen, on behalf of Primary Children's Medical 
Center, made the Atkinsons an offer P at 651, Exhibit ,, 
Roger and Poll y Atkinson discussed che proposal with tl: le . r 
parents. (Deposition of Joyce Carol Sorensen, R at 848, pp. 
14-22; deposition of Eldon Sorensen, R. at 649, pp. 9-11; 
deposition of Shirley Atkinson, h at £4fc pp 15-17; and 
deposition of George Atkinson 9 at 6 M pp. 6-48,) Roger's 
father then assisted Roger *.- . t,. ; , ,
 f ^ *-w,q i ^gether a : 
ten-page counter-proposal. (R. at 65i pi.. 6-48; R 644 at pp. 
68, 70-73.) After several meetings, an agreement was reached. 
(R, at 64 4, Kxhibit 'i ) ( HI 1 so fount' - -^'iendum 0" to 'Morgan's 
Brief of Respondent). 
4. The agreement, which ^a* eventual! y approved by 
the district court, provided that IHC, Primary Children's 
Medical Center, and their agents were to be released from claims 
arising o\ it of the March 4, ] 983 incident wherej n Chad 1 lad 
undergone oxygen deprivation, (Id,) 
5. Because the extent of Chad Atkinson 1s damages were 
uric e rt a i n, t:he agreement wa s b a s ed, on 1 y on Ro ge i: ancii P o 1 1 y 
Atkinson's assessment of Chad's condition (1d) 
6. Roger and Pol ly Atkinson were invited to have Chad 
evaluated by medical specialists in At izona, at IHC's expense to 
determine the exact nature of Chad's injuries. They declined 
the offer. (R. at 651, p.50; R. at 653, 68-69.) 
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7. Roger and Polly were aware before the settlement 
was approved by the court that Chad Atkinson had suffered brain 
damage. (See Transcript of July 22, 1983, court proceeding, 
attached to Affidavit of Philip R. Fishier, R. at 184-197, also 
attached as "Addendum A" to Morgan's Brief of Respondent, 
hereinafter "Transcript".) 
8. Roger and Polly Atkinson were apprised by the 
district court at the time the settlement agreement was 
approved, that entering into the settlement agreement would 
prohibit them from suing IHC or any of its agents if Chad's 
condition later took a turn for the worse. (Transcript at pp. 
1-2.) 
9. Roger and Polly were aware on July 22, 1983 that 
the guaranteed payout of the settlement agreement was about 
$900,000.00 plus medical expenses, rather than three million 
dollars. (Transcript at pp. 2-4). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
IHC did not not misrepresent Chad Atkinson's physical 
condition or the value of the settlement agreement. Plaintiffs 
complain that the "defendant's" induced the Atkinsons to settle 
their claims by concealing from them the physical condition of 
their son and the permanent nature of his injury, and by 
misrepresenting that the value of the settlement agreement was 
_ Q _ 
worth in excess of $3,000,000 No evidence in the record 
supports the claim that IHC either misrepresented Chad 
Atkinson1 s conn ; r i on or misr epresented the va ] ue of the 
settlement agreement. 
Plaintiffs1 action is barred by their settlement 
agreement. The plain language of the release in the settlement 
agreement should bar the plaintiffs1 claim against IHC, Wetzel 
and Olsen The release discharges IHC and Primary Children* s 
Medical Center and their agents from all claims. The release 
specifically recognizes the extent of Chad's injuries is 
uncertain f-sRcnuse plaint J f f s now believe Chad has actual 1 ";r 
suffered brain damage to a greater extent than earlier believed 
is no reason to
 reopen the settlement agreement. The release 
should prohibit the present action. 
The Atkinsons have alleged fraud invalidates the 
settlement ^qrppm^nt and tel ease. Even so, they have continued 
to demand and accept the monthly payments under the settlement 
agreement and the required payments of Chad's medical expenses. 
The victim of al 1 eged frat id c: annot botl i aff i rm and disaffirm a 
settlement agreement that contains - release To claim the 
benefits a part of the settlement agreement, which includes 
receIpt of moi 111 iJ y payments :i n medIca 1 expenses, wh:i 1 e not 
abiding by the agreement not to sue; which is the plaintiffs1 
obligation under the agreement, defeats the essential purpose o 
the compromise and settlement None of the cases cited by the 
plaintiffs stand for the principle that fraud can set aside a 
written release where the release has been approved by a prior 
court and where substantial consideration has been and will be 
paid. 
Plaintiffs' action is barred by applicable statutes of 
limitation. Chad Atkinson's injury occurred on March 4, 1983. 
Throughout the summer of 1983, the Atkinsons were informed by 
doctors, an administrator at Primary Children's Medical Center, 
and Scott Olsen that Chad was brain damaged, that the hospital 
felt responsible for Chad's injuries, and that the Atkinsons had 
a claim against the hospital. This was confirmed by the 
district judge before he approved the settlement agreement on 
July 22, 1983. At that time, the Atkinsons were also informed 
by the court that the value of the settlement agreement was 
approximately $900,000, rather than the $3,000,000 that they now 
allege was represented to them. The Atkinsons informed the 
district court at that time that Chad also had suffered brain 
damage. Such facts should be sufficient to start the statutes 
of limitations running for either medical malpractice, fraud or 
mistake. 
The Probate Court-approved settlement collaterally 
estops plaintiffs' action. The plaintiffs, as well as IHC, were 
before the Third Judicial District Court in July, 1983 to 
determine whether the financial payouts in the settlment 
agreement were sufficient to cover Chad's brain damaged 
- 10 -
condition By filing the complaint in this action, the same 
parties were before the same court trying to make the same 
determination. Plaintiffs* are once again seeking payment to 
cover Chad's condition. Because the parties and issues are 
re 1 a.ted, the pi inc:i p] e o£ co 1 1 atera 1 estoppe I shoi 11 <:! app 1 y to 
bar of this action. 
Plaintiffs 1 declaratory action lacked a justiciable 
controversy. Tl ie At:ki nsotis sought to construe 11 ie se11:] einent 
agreement to require IHC to p^y for additional institutional and 
custodial living costs To aate. defendant IHC has paid Chad 
Atkinson's medical co^ r - pursuan1 \o the settlemei it agreement as 
requested, There is no allegation,, or facts in the record, that 
plaintiffs have ever requested IHC to pay for any of the items 
referred to, or that IHC has refused to pay them. Since no 
breach or anticipated breach was p:ed or shown in the record, 
p 1 a i n t i £ £ s £ a :i ] e d t o s h o w a j u s t i c i a b 1 e c o n t r o v e i s y r i p e f c i : a 
declaratory judgment. 
The motion to amend the complaint was properly 
denied. Plaintiffs 1 motion to .<••• >.*: • n^ . - : - * . ide 
a claim for medical malpractice against IHC was properly denied 
by the district court. The claim was untimely under either the 
one or two-year statute of 1imitation, or the four-year statute 
of repose of the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act, since the 
Atkinsons f noti ce of i ntei it to commence an action was filed 
approximately four and one-half years after they discovered they 
- 11 -
had a cause of action, and nearly five years after the injury 
occurred. 
Defendant-respondent IHC Hospitals, Inc. is requesting 
that the district court's grant of its motion for summary 
judgment be affirmed. 
ARGUMENT 
IHC believes this action should never have been 
brought and is a waste of judicial and defendants1 resources. 
The parties settled the underlying claims in July 1983 after a 
summer of negotiating the various terms of the settlement. 
Given the nature of Chad Atkinson's injuries, the 
treating physicians could not predict Chad's future condition. 
Defendants even offered to pay for a specialist to examine Chad 
Atkinson before the settlement agreement was entered into so 
that an independent evaluation could be made of Chad's 
condition. The Atkinsons declined the offer. Now the 
plaintiffs allege that Chad Atkinson's condition is worse than 
what they had been told by "the defendants." 
There is no evidence in the record that any 
representation made by IHC was negligently made or was knowingly 
false. There is also no evidence in the record that the 
settlement, which guarantees at least $740,000.00 to the 
plaintiffs, and more than $1,280,000.00 if Chad lives to age 65, 
is unfair or is an inadequate amount given the nature of Chad's 
injuries. 
IHC • - v - •). t • its: o?::> Ligations under the 
settlement agreement for over six years and has paid its 
required payments and regular monthly payments, as well as all 
submitted medical expenses. IHC believes the settlement was 
fair and that the plaintiffs1 present action seeking more money 
is barred "by the release contained • the settlement aoreminent, 
as well as applicable statutes of limitation and the principles 
of collateral estoppel. 
I• IHC DID NOT MISREPRESENT CHAD ATKINSON'S PHYSICAL 
CONDITION OR THE VALUE OF THE SETTLEMENT 
AGREEMENT. 
Plaintiffs complain that the "defendants" induced the 
Atkinsons to settle their claims ; oi:rf».-, ; i r^ t. .- • aeixt t .he 
physical condition of their son an:, the permanent nature of his 
injury, and by misrepresenting that the valu*--* :f ' h** settlement 
agreement was % *fr; pxre-s f tnree .. . \ \ -jr, J- tars. 
(Complaint, R. -^  - ' ' '-* 5151 a 1° * When asked *- discovery to 
specify what was concealed by IHC, plaintiffs are silent. The 
reco rd, howeve i , i e f ] ect s tl 1at the doc to rs wo rking at Primary 
Children's Medical Center provided the Atkinsons with what 
information was available, and the Atkinsons so admitted. 
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In addition, no evidence in the record supports the 
claim that IHC represented the value of the settlement agreement 
at three million dollars. The value of the agreement can be 
seen on its face as paying out between approximately $740,000.00 
and $1,280,000.00, depending on the circumstances, plus medical 
expenses. The district court confirmed the Atkinsons1 
understanding of this before the settlement agreement was 
court-approved. 
Plaintiffs fail to show the necessary elements of 
either fraud or negligent misrepresentation. There is no 
evidence in the record that IHC made a false representation 
concerning a fact which IHC (or its doctors, for that matter) 
knew to be false or was made recklessly or negligently without 
sufficient knowledge, or that they omitted material facts when 
there was a duty of disclosure for the purpose of inducing the 
Atkinsons to act. Taylor v. Gasor, Inc., 607 P.2d 293 (Utah 
1980); Christensen v. Commonwealth Land Title Ins. Co., 666 P.2d 
302 (Utah 1983). 
A. Drs. Matlak and Thompson could not predict Chad 
Atkinson's future condition. 
The Atkinsons complain the doctors would not tell them 
what Chad's future condition would be, and that this omission 
constitutes fraud or negligent misrepresentation. Plaintiffs 
have not shown that the doctors should have been able to 
- 14 -
foretell Chad's future condition. A review of the record shows 
that neither Dr. Matlak nor Dr. Thompson could predict Chad's 
future condition given the nature of his injuries. See, e.g., 
R. at 645, pp. 10-11 (Dr. Matlak discussed the effects of the 
brain damage with Roger and Polly, such as feeding problems, 
motor difficulties, spasticity and seizures); R. 645, pp. 11-12 
(Dr. Matlak told Roger and Polly the brain damage could be 
permanent, but it could not be predicted). 
Observation and the passage of time would be needed to 
determine what Chad's future condition would be. See, e.g., R. 
at 645, p.15, 16, line 17-24 (time is needed to determine the 
extent of a child's injury or the extent of the ultimate 
handicaps a child will have); Dr. Thompson testified that given 
the nature of Chad's injury, there was no way to predict what 
Chad's outcome would be. Chad would have to be observed for 
months or possibly years. See R. at 650, pp. 39-40, 43-45, 46. 
The Atkinsons' testimony is consistent with that of 
Dr. Matlak and Dr. Thompson. See R. at 647, pp. 23-24, 25 (Dr. 
Matlak did "explain the worst" and told the Atkinsons that they 
would have to wait to see what Chad's condition would be); R. at 
647, pp. 25-26. ("He would tell us that only time would tell 
what would happen.") 
Finally, there was no reliance on Dr. Matlak's opinion 
for purposes of a settlement. The Atkinsons did not seek advice 
from Dr. Matlak as to a prognosis for purposes of settlement. 
See R. at 645, pp. 37, lines 6-18. Even after settlement, the 
Atkinsons received no different information from the doctors 
than they had before. R. at 647, pp. 114-115. 
B. The Atkinsons knew Chad's injuries could be 
permanent and they anticipated future problems. 
There is substantial evidence in the record that the 
Atkinsons were aware not only that Chad had brain damage, but 
that they discussed it and anticipated that they may have future 
problems. See R. at 644, p.29 (someone, "maybe Dr. Matlak," 
informed Roger that Chad would "not be normal"); when the 
Atkinsons took Chad home from the hospital he was not normal. 
RD at 644, p.33 (Chad still had to be fed through a nasogastric 
tube). 
It is clear that Roger and Polly contemplated Chad's 
institutionalization. See R. at 644, pp. 63-64: 
MR. FELT: My question was, "At what 
point in time did you decide 
that the amount they offered 
you in writing here on 
Exhibit 1 was not agreeable 
to you? 
ROGER ATKINSON: We sat down and talked 
maybe after the second 
meeting after we went 
through, me and Polly and so 
forth, and thought maybe they 
did mess him up and there was 
things like 
institutionalization if he 
didn't grow up right because 
they said there was an 
- ift -
accident and if they did, 
these are things we had to 
plan fore 
MR. FELT: Did they discuss the problem 
of institutionalization with 
you at that time? 
ROGER ATKINSON: I think at one time we did, 
further on down the road, 
though. 
Roger had even discussed the concept of institutionalization 
with his father: 
MR. FELT: Where did you first get the 
idea of the possibility that 
Chad would have to be 
institutionalized? 
ROGER ATKINSON: Me and my father thinking 
together, just in case it ever 
did happen, because you never 
know. 
Id. at 80. See also R. at 644, p. 68 ("I felt like if there was 
going to be a problem later on in life there should be something 
for the people who was going to take care of him.") R. at 644, 
p. 150 (Roger read the release and knew the injuries could be 
permanent; he was so informed.) R. at 647, p. 81, lines 3-6 
(before accepting the settlement offer, Roger and Polly 
discussed Chad's brain damage.) R. at 647, p. 124, line 6-8 
(Polly Atkinson was told brain damage was a serious injury); R. 
at 647, p. 34 (Polly Atkinson knew that Chad was being kept on 
phenobarbital to prevent seizures). 
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C. While the settlement negotiations were ongoing, 
Chad was in the Atkinsons1 care and custody; the doctors relied 
on the Atkinsons' representations of Chad's condition for their 
evaluations. 
The Atkinsons were very much aware of Chad's condition 
during the summer of 1983 while settlement negotiations were 
ongoing. Early in the summer, before the Atkinsons were even 
approached about settlement, Chad was released from the hospital 
to the care of his parents. During the follow-up visits that 
occurred, the doctors had to rely on the Atkinsons' 
representations about Chad's condition in order to make a 
complete evaluation. See, R. at 645, pp. 18-19 (Polly Atkinson 
provided Dr. Matlak information on Chad's development to assist 
with the doctor's assessment); R. at 645, pp. 22-23 (after Chad 
left the hospital, Marty Palmer, an independent physician, was 
the pediatrician providing primary care for Chad); R. at 645, p. 
24 (Dr. Matlak's statement to Dr. Palmer that Chad was 
performing at "an age appropriate fashion" was based in part on 
information obtained from Polly Atkinson); R. at 645, p.39 
(Polly Atkinson told Dr. Thompson during an examination that 
Chad was "doing really good"). 
D. Before the settlement agreement was finalized, the 
Atkinsons refused an independent medical evaluation. 
During the summer of 1983, a series of about five 
meetings were held while the parties worked out the terms of the 
settlement. Because the doctors could not give an absolute 
diagnosis and prognosis of Chad's condition, Scott Olsen offered 
to have additional medical tests run by an independent physician 
in Arizona at no cost to the Atkinsons. R. at 653, pp. 68-69; 
R. at 651, p. 50. That offer occurred probably after the second 
meeting with the Atkinsons. Roger and Polly decided against the 
tests. Id. 
E. IHC did not misrepresent the value of the 
settlement. 
There is no evidence in the record to support the 
plaintiffs' claim that IHC represented the value of the 
settlement agreement at three million dollars. The source for 
that figure was the Atkinsons' ten-page counter-proposal, 
drafted by Roger and his father, which was rejected by Scott 
Olsen and IHC. The record shows that the Atkinsons knew the 
approximate payout of the settlement agreement would be 
$900,000,00, plus medical expenses, which was confirmed by the 
district court before the settlement agreement was signed. (See 
R. at 647, pp. 59, 62-63; Transcript at p. 4). 
Plaintiffs argue the present value of the structured 
settlement is only about $109,000.00. The present value of the 
settlement is irrelevant. During the negotiations no one made 
any representation as to what the present value of the 
settlement was. Second, the fact that a settlement in a medical 
malpractice case is structured does not make it inappropriate or 
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unfair. The Legislature requires such where damages exceed 
$100,000.00. See Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-9.5(2): 
(2) In any malpractice action against a 
health care provider, as defined in Subsection 
78-14-3(29), the court shall, at the request 
of any party, order that future damages which 
equal or exceed $100,000.00, less amounts 
payable for attorney's fees and other costs 
which are due at the time of judgment, shall 
be paid by periodic payments rather than by a 
lump sum payment. 
Finally, there is no evidence in the record that 
Chad's damages should have been compensated at a figure higher 
than the amount set forth in the settlement agreement. 
II. PLAINTIFFS' ACTION IS BARRED BY THEIR 
SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT. 
A. Plaintiffs' claim against IHC is barred by the 
plain language of the release. 
The Atkinsons have been quick to say the release 
contained in the settlement agreement entered into by the 
parties in July 1983 is not binding on them so as to prohibit 
their action against IHC. Mutual obligations in an agreement 
should work both ways. They have kept the benefits of the 
settlement agreement, but have ignored their obligations under 
the agreement. 
As the discovered facts show, plaintiffs negotiated an 
agreement with IHC, which was approved by the Third Judicial 
District Court. The agreement, signed by the plaintiffs as 
guardians and conservators of Chad Atkinson, prohibits this 
action: 
Hereby on their own behalf and on behalf of 
their minor child, Chad Atkinson, and their 
heirs, executors, administrators, successors 
and assigns, release, acquit and forever 
discharge Intermountain Health Care Hospitals, 
Inc., and Primary Children's Medical Center or 
their agents, servants, successors, heirs, 
executors, administrators, of and from any and 
all claims, actions, causes of action, 
demands, rights, damages, costs, loss of 
service, expenses and compensation whatsoever, 
which [Roger and Polly Atkinson] or their 
minor child, Chad Atkinson, now have or which 
may hereafter acc[ru]e on account of or in any 
way growing out of any and all known and 
unknown, foreseen and unforeseen bodily and 
personal injuries and property damage and the 
consequences thereof resulting or to result 
from the accident, casualty or event which 
occurred on or about the 4th day of March, 
1983, at the Primary Children's Medical 
Center. 
It is understood and agreed that this 
settlement is a compromise of a doubtful and 
disputed claim, and that the payment made is 
not to be construed as an admission of 
liability on the part of the party or parties 
hereby released and that said releasees deny 
liability therefor and merely intend to avoid 
litigation and buy their peace. 
Settlement Agreement, R. at 15-16 (emphasis added). IHC 
believes this release bars plaintiffs' claims against itself as 
well as Wetzel and Olsen. 
The plaintiffs in their complaint and Brief of 
Appellants have tried to counter the plain language of the 
release by alleging that defendants misrepresented Chad's 
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condition, which caused them to settle the claim. There is no 
dispute, however, that plaintiffs knew Chad suffered brain 
damage as the result of the incident on March 4, 1983. To 
assist them in getting an independent medical evaluation, 
plaintiffs were invited by Scott Olsen to send Chad to 
specialists for tests and then wait to determine the extent of 
Chad's injury before settlement was entered into. The 
plaintiffs declined the offer and chose to go forward with the 
settlement. 
On July 22, 1983, the Third Judicial District Court 
inquired whether Roger and Polly Atkinson were aware that future 
changes in Chad's condition were not actionable: 
THE COURT: What's the nature of the 
child's of the child's injury? 
MRS. ATKINSON: Brain damage. 
THE COURT: Do you understand that by 
settling this case, and 
regardless of what later 
transpires, when you find out 
later that the child's injuries 
are worse than you anticipated, 
and on the other hand, even if 
it's better, that you will not 
ever be able to come back 
against Intermountain Health 
Care? Do you understand that? 
MRS. ATKINSON: Yes, Sir, I do. 
Transcript at pp. 1-2. 
Simply because plaintiffs now believe Chad has 
actually suffered brain damage to a greater extent than earlier 
_ oo _ 
believed is no reason to reopen the settlement agreement. The 
release should prohibit the present action. 
Bo Plaintiffs cannot both affirm and disaffirm. 
The plaintiffs' approach in affirming the contractual 
benefits while disaffirming the contractual release of all 
claims against IHC, which is the essential purpose of the 
agreement, is not permissible. Under the circumstances, the 
Atkinsons have to either affirm the contract in its entirety and 
be bound by the release in the settlement agreement or disaffirm 
the contract and sue on the original claim. If they affirm the 
contract, which they appear to have done by continually 
demanding the monthly benefits and payment of medical expenses, 
while keeping all sums disbursed to them, they have to accept 
the terms of the contract, the most important of which is a 
prohibition against this suit. 
The victim of alleged fraud cannot both affirm and 
disaffirm. See 37 Am.Jur. 2d, Fraud and Deceit § 328, note 1; 
and Restatement, Contracts §§ 484, 485. To claim the benefits 
of part of the settlement agreement, which includes receipt of 
monthly payments and medical expenses, while not abiding by the 
agreement not to sue, which is plaintiffs' obligation under the 
agreement, defeats the essential purpose of the compromise and 
settlement. 
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Plaintiffs are not permitted to seek a remedy based on 
affirmance which is inconsistent with the remedy based on 
disaffirmance. The theories are not consistent. As noted by 
one court: 
Having affirmed the settlement contract, 
[plaintiffs] may not also avoid the burdens of 
that contract, including [their] promise not 
to sue [the defendant]. A remedy based on 
affirmance of the contract is inconsistent 
with the remedy, arising out of the same 
facts, based on disaffirmance, and 
rescission. Holscher v. Ferry, 131 Colo. 190, 
280 P.2d 655 (1955). When [plaintiffs] 
elected to affirm the contract, [they] 
abandoned [their] right to rescind it in whole 
or in part. Id. Hence the covenant not to 
sue remains enforceable. 
Trimball v. City and County of Denver, 697 P.2d 716, 723 (Colo. 
1985) (emphasis added). In fact, the reverse may now be true. 
"Where one party repudiates the contract or prevents performance 
thereof, the other party may rescind and recover what he has 
paid and the value of any performance on his part." 
Restatement, Contracts § 347. Thus, plaintiffs should not be 
able to maintain an action for fraud while affirming an 
agreement with the release in place. As noted in 58 A.L.R. 2d 
at 508, an action cannot be maintained to recover damages for 
fraud practiced upon the plaintiff in inducing him to execute a 
release to the defendant for personal injuries, since the fraud 
complaint renders the release invalid, and the original cause of 
action remains to the plaintiff. 
If the release is invalid (which must be the result if 
it was obtained by fraud) the injured plaintiffs have the remedy 
of suing on the original cause of action, and hence have 
suffered no damage from the alleged fraud or misrepresentation., 
Counts I and II of the complaint must therefore be barred by the 
release in the settlement agreement. None of plaintiffs1 cited 
cases invalidate a court-approved release. 
Plaintiffs claim the agreement in this present action 
was based on an inaccurate assessment of Chad's physical 
condition, and that because the defendants misrepresented the 
true state of his situation, the settlement agreement should 
essentially be modified, with the payout increased from 
approximately $1,280,000.00 to three million dollars. As noted 
above in the first argument, however, plaintiffs have no 
evidence in the record which shows IHC or the treating 
physicians misstated Chad's condition. 
In support of their proposition, plaintiffs cite five 
cases supposedly standing for the principle that fraud can set 
aside a written release. None of the cases, however, grant a 
court authority to invalidate a written release that has been 
approved by a prior court and where significant consideration 
has and will be paid. A review of plaintiffs1 cases (see Brief 
of Appellants at pp. 39-40) show that none are addressed to the 
facts of this case. See Kelly v. Salt Lake Transportation Co.# 
116 P.2d 383 (Utah 1941) (insurance adjuster settled personal 
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injury claim for $20.00 and payment of medical bills in exchange 
for a written release; the court held the alleged inadequate 
consideration was not so grossly inadequate as to indicate 
fraud; plaintiff had opportunity to consult with others before 
making a decision to accept; the court reversed a jury verdict 
and directed judgment for the defendants); Automobile 
Underwriters v. Rich, 53 N.E. 2d 775 (Ind. 1944). (Release was 
signed in exchange for $150.00 by plaintiff who was in the care 
of a physician for a permanently injured knee-cap; the 
defendant's claims agent falsely told plaintiff he had 
investigated her injuries and the injuries were not permanent 
but merely temporary, and that she could go to work in a few 
days); Inman v. Merchants Mutual Casualty Co., 83 N.Y.S. 2d 801, 
274 App. Div. 320 (1948) (the court set aside a release where a 
wrongful death action was exchanged for $400.00 by the mother of 
a deceased son; defendant's agent had misrepresented that her 
son had caused the accident, that if she sued she would not get 
anything and would have to pay legal fees, and that the 
settlement would be satisfactory to the mother's attorney); 
Estes v. Magee, 109 P.2d 631 (Ida. 1940) (release induced by 
physician-defendant was set aside; physician had paid plaintiff 
$200.00 and misrepresented the degree of patient's injuries, 
asserting that the injuries were not serious and that the 
patient would entirely recover in a short time); and Southern 
Ry. Co. v. James, 140 N.E. 556 (Ind. 1923) (release was set 
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aside which was procured by payment of $500.00 in 
misrepresentations of defendant's agents that they had 
supposedly consulted plaintiff's physician, who had allegedly 
informed them that his injuries were temporary and that he would 
be fully and completely recovered in one year, and that he would 
receive "a life-time job" which never materialized). 
IHC does not dispute that fraud can set aside a 
written release. However, plaintiffs, not only show no evidence 
of misrepresentations by IHC, whether negligent or knowing, but 
cite no authority for invalidating a written release where the 
prior court approving the settlement and release specifically 
questioned competent plaintiffs about the very issues now being 
raised as a basis for deception, and where the performance under 
the settlement agreement has been and will be substantial. 
III. PLAINTIFFS' ACTION IS BARRED BY APPLICABLE 
STATUTES OF LIMITATION. 
Chad Atkinson's injury occurred on March 4, 1983. 
Throughout the summer of 1983, beginning no later than May 27, 
the Atkinsons were informed by doctors, an administrator at 
Primary Children's Medical Center, and Scott Olsen that Chad was 
brain damaged, that the hospital felt responsible for Chad's 
injuries, and that the Atkinsons had a valid claim against the 
hospital. This was confirmed by the district judge before 
approving the settlement agreement on July 22, 1983. At that 
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time, they were informed by the Court that the value of the 
settlement agreement was approximately $900,000.00, rather than 
the alleged three million dollars. The district court was 
informed by the Atkinsons at that time that Chad had suffered 
brain damage. Such facts should be sufficient to start the 
statutes of limitations running for either medical malpractice, 
fraud or mistake. 
A. The Health Care Malpractice Act bars this action. 
Plaintiffs have failed to comply with the Utah Health 
Care Malpractice Act's provisions requiring, among other things, 
the timely filing of a notice of intent before an action is 
commenced against a health care provider. The Act is not 
limited to "pure" actions of medical malpractice. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-3(29) explains which actions 
come within the Health Care Malpractice Act: 
Any action against a health care provider 
whether in contract, tort, breach of warranty, 
wrongful death or otherwise, based upon 
alleged personal injuries relating to or 
arising out of health care rendered or which 
should have been rendered by the health care 
provider. 
This is certainly an action against a health care 
provider in "contract, tort, . . . . or otherwise, based upon 
alleged personal injuries relating to health care rendered or 
which should have been rendered by the health care provider." 
Id. If there is any doubt, one only needs to consider the 
nature of the plaintiffs1 claims and the evidence that will be 
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asserted to show damages. Though plaintiffs claim this is a 
fraud action, plaintiffs will eventually need to prove medical 
malpractice to the same extent as if they had sued on the 
original cause of action. 
This case falls neatly into the problem long 
recognized and explained in 58 A.L.R. 2d at 501, note 1. Where 
the original cause of action is one for unliquidated damages, as 
in the ordinary personal injury situation, plaintiffs face the 
difficulty of establishing the extent of the injury attributable 
to the fraud or duress that induced the execution of the release 
or compromise agreement. Trying such an action becomes awkward, 
since the fact-finder in the fraud action has to consider the 
evidence as to the original tort and estimate the amount the 
plaintiffs would have recovered if they had brought suit and 
forced their claim on the original claim for personal injury. 
Thus, a fact-finder trying an issue of negligence 
allegedly resulting in personal injury in an action brought 
exclusively to recover for such injury is one thing; but a 
fact-finder trying an issue of negligence in an action for fraud 
and deceit, to determine how much the plaintiffs would have 
recovered if they had litigated their negligence claim, is 
something else again. 
It is clear the issues and evidence in plaintiffs' 
fraud claim parallel the issues and evidence in the original 
medical malpractice claim. The proof on damages will involve 
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the identical proof needed to show liability and extent of 
injury as would have to be shown in the medical malpractice 
suit. Thus, defendant IHC believes the Health Care Malpractice 
Act squarely applies, since this is an action in contract, tort 
or otherwise which relates to health care which should have been 
rendered by the health care provider. 
The Atkinsons tried to avoid the statute of 
limitations by claiming that instead of suing for medical 
malpractice, they are suing because the defendants fraudulently 
concealed information from them. Though the Atkinsons have 
shown no evidence in the record that IHC misrepresented any 
facts, even if they did, the one-year statute of limitations for 
fraudulent concealment contained in § 78-14-4(1)(b) would bar 
their action. 
Since plaintiffs have failed to comply with the 
provisions of the Health Care Malpractice Act in timely bringing 
their suit, IHC believes the Atkinsons' complaint was 
appropriately dismissed by the district judge for failure to 
meet the statutory prerequisite of timely filing a notice of 
intent to commence an action as required by Utah Code Ann. § 
78-14-8, and the applicable two-year statute of limitations 
under § 78-14-4(1). 
B. Applicability of the statute of limitations to a 
minor is constitutional. 
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The Atkinsons argue that if the medical malpractice 
statute of limitations bars Chad Atkinsons1 claim, that this 
would violate his Utah constitutional rights to equal protection 
and access to courts. In the interest of brevity, and to avoid 
duplication, IHC adopts the response of Wetzel and Olsen as set 
forth in their Brief of Respondents. The long line of precedent 
therein cited, and the reasons therefor, should confirm that the 
Utah legislature necessarily and appropriately capped the time 
in which a minor can bring a claim. 
In addition to the argument supporting the 
constitutionality of the medical malpractice statute of 
limitation and the statute of repose, IHC wishes to point out 
that the Health Care Malpractice Act is not irrational merely 
because a parent as natural guardian, or someone else as 
guardian ad litem, may need to pursue the child's cause of 
action on the child's behalf. 
In most instances parents have the primary 
responsibility to protect, educate and care for their children. 
For example, some specific duties now placed on the parent for 
the child's protection are set forth in Utah Code Ann. § 78-11-6 
(parent or guardian may sue for death or injury of minor caused 
by wrongful act or neglect of another); § 78-45-3, (every man 
shall support his child); § 78-45-9 (an obligee or state 
department of social services may enforce a child's right of 
support against parent); § 76-7-201 (failure to provide medical 
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care is criminal neglect). See also 12 A.L.R. 2d 1047. Compare 
Wasescha v. Wasescha, 548 P.2d 895 (Utah 1976) (children have a 
right to support); Ottley v. Hill, 21 Utah 2d 396, 446 P.2d 301 
(1968) (a parent is under a legal duty to pay medical care); 
Gulley v. Gulley, 570 P. 2d 127 (Utah 1977) (a parent cannot rid 
himself of his duty to support his children by contract); Gawand 
v. Gawand, 615 P.2d 422 (Utah 1980) (parent has duties to 
support a retarded child). See also 34 A.L.R. 2d 1460 (right of 
child against parent for its support). 
Parents are natural guardians of minor children and as 
such have vested rights and duties to act in the children's 
behalf. See 39 Am.Jur 2d, Guardian and Ward, § 5, setting forth 
the long established principle that a guardian has not only a 
right, but a duty, to institute and prosecute litigation 
necessary to maintain and preserve a ward's rights. A guardian 
may also be liable for a loss caused by the guardian's neglect 
or for breach of duty. Id. at § 187. Parents are not exempt 
from this duty. As natural guardians of the child, they are the 
trustees of the child's rights which are vested in the parents 
for the benefit of the child. Id. at § 8. They have a duty to 
protect and preserve the rights and welfare of the children, id. 
at § 14, and are charged with the care and management of the 
children's estates. Id. at § 48. 
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C. Plaintiffs1 complaint for fraud or mistake is 
barred by § 78-12-26(3). 
In addition to being barred by the medical malpractice 
statute of limitations, the Atkinsons' complaint is also barred 
by the three-year statute of limitations covering claims of 
fraud or mistake. Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-26(3). Plaintiffs' 
claims for fraud and negligent misrepresentation would have to 
have been brought within three years from the day the fraud or 
mistake was discovered. 
The Atkinsons seek damages for the defendants' 
misrepresentation of Chad's condition. The central theory of 
plaintiffs' complaint is that the defendants allegedly 
represented the "settlement was worth in excess of three million 
dollars." (Complaint, R. at 2-19, fl 18.) Based on that alleged 
representation of the value of Chad's damaged condition, 
plaintiffs assert the present value of the actual settlement is 
$109,000.00. They then claim damages of $2,891,000.00, which 
represents the difference between the "represented" value and 
the alleged actual value of the settlement. According to 
plaintiffs' complaint, had the settlement agreement been for 
three million dollars as represented, there would be no need for 
this action. Note that the Atkinsons ignore the fact in their 
brief that regardless of Chad's condition, IHC has paid and will 
pay Chad's medical expenses, which could exceed three million 
dollars if he suffers a significant reverse. In addition to 
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this amount, Chad would also receive a payment of approximately 
$900,000.00 to cover general damages. Further, note that 
nowhere in the record is there evidence that IHC represented the 
value of the settlement agreement would be three million dollars. 
Under Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-26(3) an "action for 
relief on the ground of fraud or mistake" must be brought within 
three years from the date the fraud or mistake is discovered. 
The statute would cover Counts I and II of the complaint for 
fraud and negligent misrepresentation. See, e.g., Larsen v. 
Utah Loan and Trust Co., 23 Utah 449, 65 P. 208 (1901) (this 
section applies to the fraud of a bank even though the fraud is 
not intentional); Gibson v. Jensen, 48 Utah 244, 158 P.426 
(1916) (one informed of such facts as will put a person of 
ordinary intelligence and prudence on inquiry has received such 
information as will start the running of limitations). 
Assuming plaintiffs1 allegation that the settlement 
agreement was to represent a value of three million dollars, 
even though there is no evidence in the record IHC represented 
such, when did the Atkinsons learn the settlement agreement 
would not pay that amount? An undisputed water mark is July 22, 
1983, when the district court interviewed plaintiffs Roger and 
Polly Atkinson: 
THE COURT: Well, what's your 

















That he would be taken care 
of both medical, financial, 
his education. 
Do you understand that this 
provides for monthly payments? 
Yes, I do. 
Do you understand that it 
will be -- you will get 
$500.00 per month or $6,000 a 
year? 
Yes, sir, I do. 
What about a bond, Mr. Morgan? 
They are seeking approval 
without bond. 
I think in light of the fact 
that we are going to have a 
-- if the child gets to be 65 
years of age the total payout 
will be $900,000.00. 
Correct. 
* * * * 
And your name, sir? 
Roger W. Atkinson. 
Are you the father of the 
child? 
Yes. 
Do you believe that you, on 
behalf of the child, have a 
claim against Intermountain 
Health Care? 
Yes, I do. 
It's my understanding that 
there's a structured 
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settlement of a total payout 
of $900,000.00? 
MR. ATKINSON: Yes, sir* 
THE COURT: Do you feel that this is 
adequate? 
MR. ATKINSON: Yah, I do, considering the 
hospitalization and 
everything like that will be 
covered. 
THE COURT: Do you feel this is in the 
best interest of the child? 
MR. ATKINSON: I do. 
THE COURT: All right. I will approve 
the settlement. 
Transcript at pp. 2-4. 
Counting three years from July 22, 1983, the date of 
the court hearing, would require plaintiffs to file their 
complaint by July 23, 1986. The complaint, however, was not 
filed until July 26, 1987, a full year beyond the expired 
statute of limitations for fraud or mistake. 
IV. THE PROBATE COURT-APPROVED SETTLEMENT 
COLLATERALLY ESTOPS PLAINTIFFS' ACTION. 
Roger, Polly and Chad Atkinson, as well as IHC, were 
before the Third Judicial District Court in July 1983 to 
determine whether the financial payouts in the settlement 
agreement were sufficient to cover Chad's brain damaged 
condition. By filing the complaint in this action, the same 
parties were before the same court in an attempt to make the 
ic 
same determination. Plaintiffs are again seeking payment to 
cover Chad's condition. Because the parties and issues are 
related, the principle of collateral estoppel should apply to 
bar this action. 
Collateral estoppel prevents parties or their privies 
from relitigating facts and issues in the second suit that were 
fully resolved in the first suit. Searle Bros, v. Searle, 588 
P.2d 689, 690 (Utah 1978). That the first action was to approve 
a settlement agreement, and the second seeks damages in addition 
to those provided by the earlier agreement, matters little to 
collateral estoppel. It is the related issue that is examined. 
A four-fold test is used to determine if the second action is 
sufficiently related to bar it: 
1. Was the issue decided in the prior 
adjudication identical with the one presented 
in the action in question? 
2. Was there a final judgment on the merits? 
3. Was the party against whom the plea is 
asserted party or in privity with a party to 
the prior adjudication? 
4. Was the issue in the first case 
competently, fully and fairly litigated? 
Id. at 691. 
In applying this test, it can plainly be seen that the 
issue in both the 1983 court approval and the present action 
satisfies the first element of collateral estoppel. The issue 
was then and is now, whether certain damages are adequate to 
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cover Chad's condition. Whether the issue is "decided" in the 
prior adjudication depends on whether it was "essential to 
resolution" of the first suit. See Robertson v. Campbell, 674 
P.2d 1226 (Utah 1983). Clearly, an understanding of Chad's 
condition and the knowledge of the total financial payout was 
essential to the Court's evaluation and appraisal of the 
appropriateness of the settlement agreement. The Court relied 
on the admissions of both Roger and Polly Atkinson that they 
were aware of the child's condition, that they had evaluated the 
appropriateness of the settlement agreement, and that they 
thought it was in the best interest of Chad Atkinson for the 
Court to approve the same. 
Looking to the second element of collateral estoppel, 
there was a final judgment. The Court specifically ordered that 
the conservators, Roger and Polly Atkinson, were authorized to 
accept the settlement offer as was set forth in the petition. 
The Court further ordered that all claims of Chad Atkinson 
against Intermountain Health Care Hospitals, Inc. could be 
released. See Order Approving Settlement of Minor's Claim and 
To Execute Specific Release and Assignment, Exhibit 10 to 
Deposition of Roger Atkinson, R. at 644. 
As to the third and fourth elements, the parties are 
identical and the issue of appropriate damages for Chad's 
condition was competently, fully and fairly resolved. The 
Atkinsons admitted they knew that Chad was brain damaged, heard 
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the court recite the payout was approximately $900,000.00, and 
admitted to the court that they believed the settlement was in 
the best interest of Chad Atkinson. The fourth element is 
satisfied if the parties "receive notice reasonably calculated, 
under all the circumstances to apprise them of the pendency of 
the action and afford them an opportunity to present their 
objections." Berry v. Berry, 738 P.2d 246, 249 (Utah App. 
1987). Not only were the plaintiffs actually present in the 
court room, but the court after due investigation found the 
settlement agreement was fair in all respects. See Order, R. at 
644, Exhibit 10, p.l ("said settlement in all respects is 
fair"). 
V. PLAINTIFFS1 DECLARATORY JUDGMENT ACTION LACKED A 
JUSTICIABLE CONTROVERSY. 
Through their complaint, the Atkinsons also sought a 
declaratory judgment construing the settlement agreement to 
require IHC to pay for institutional and custodial living 
costs. 
On September 3, 1987, IHC filed a motion to dismiss 
Count IV of the complaint. By agreement of counsel, the motion 
was not noticed for hearing until after discovery pertinent to 
the issues had been completed. Since the discovery showed no 
dispute as to any material fact, IHC then moved for summary 
judgment. 
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In IHC's initial memorandum, it was pointed out to the 
district court that plaintiffs had no justiciable controversy. 
In Count IV of the complaint the Atkinsons asked the court to 
declare IHC responsible to pay certain anticipated institutional 
and custodial care costs. To date, defendant IHC has paid Chad 
Atkinson's medical costs pursuant to the settlement agreement as 
requested. There is no allegation or facts in the record 
indicating that plaintiffs have ever requested IHC to pay for 
any items referred to in Count IV or that IHC has refused to pay 
them. (See Deposition of Polly Atkinson, R. at 648, p.113.) 
Since no breach or anticipated breach was pled or shown in the 
record, plaintiffs' claim under Count IV was not ripe and 
therefore subject to dismissal by the district court. 
Plaintiffs attempted to salvage Count IV by asserting 
that even though there has been no breach or anticipated breach 
of the settlement agreement the plaintiffs and IHC entered into, 
that the Declaratory Judgment Act, Utah Code Ann. § 78-33-1, et 
seqD, still permits them to ask the court for an advisory 
opinion. 
Plaintiffs' assertion that no actual controversy is 
necessary is contrary to Utah law. A complaint seeking a 
declaratory judgment is still required to plead the existence of 
a justiciable controversy. See, e.g., Merhish v. H.A. Folsom <£ 
Assoc., 646 P.2d 731 (Utah 1982) (notwithstanding its broad 
terms, declaratory judgment legislation is still subject to 
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requirements of justiciability); Baird v. State, 574 P.2d 713 
(Utah 1978) ("Courts have no jurisdiction to render a 
declaratory judgment in the absence of a justiciable or actual 
controversy"; the court's immediate duty is to dismiss the 
defective cause of action); Backman v. Salt Lake County, 13 Utah 
2d 412, 375 P.2d 756 (1962) (the Declaratory Judgment Act is not 
designed for giving advisory opinions in a non-advisory action, 
or to insure against feared risk). 
IHC has continued to perform under the settlement 
agreement; no claims have been denied to date that relate in any 
way to Count IV. Count IV should be dismissed for failure to 
plead a justiciable controversy. 
VI. THE MOTION TO AMEND THE COMPLAINT WAS PROPERLY 
DENIED. 
At the hearing on the motions for summary judgment of 
IHC, Wetzel and Olsen, the district court denied the plaintiffs1 
motion to amend their complaint because "the Motions for Summary 
Judgment dispose of that." (R. at 655, p.45.) Insofar as the 
motion to amend pertained to IHC, three reasons support the 
denial. 
Count II of the Second Proposed Amended Complaint (R. 
at 569-588) would have added a claim for medical malpractice 
against IHC. Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-4(1). The claim was 
untimely under either the one or two year statutes of 
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limitation, or the four year statute of repose of the Utah 
Health Care Malpractice Act. 
The two-year statute of limitations set forth at 
§ 78-14-4(1) requires the commencement of an action within two 
years from the time a "plaintiff or patient discovers, or 
through the use of reasonable diligence should have discovered 
the injury, whichever first occurs." When did plaintiffs 
discover they had a claim against IHC? Certainly, as early as 
May 27, 1983 when the Atkinsons met with Primary Children's 
administrator and Scott Olsen and were informed Primary 
Children's Medical Center felt responsible for what had happened 
to Chad, (R. at 644, pp. 38-39, R. at 647, p. 44,) Throughout 
the summer of 1983, the Atkinsons were informed by doctors and 
Scott Olsen that Chad had suffered oxygen deprivation after an 
alarm on the machine attending him was not heard, as the alarm 
may have been turned down. Clearly, they had discovered by July 
22, 1983 that they had a claim against IHC when the District 
Court asked Polly Atkinson: 
THE COURT: Do you believe you have a 
claim against Intermountain 
Health Care? 
MRS. ATKINSON: Yes, I do. 
(Transcript, p.1.) 
Plaintiffs, however, assert in the Second Proposed 
Amended Complaint that they did not discover the medical 
malpractice "because of fraudulent concealment." R. at 569-588, 
IF 37. As noted above, there is no evidence in the record that 
IHC negligently or fraudulently represented Chad Atkinson's 
condition. Even assuming there was discovery of a difference 
between IHC's representations and Chad's condition, it would 
have been discovered shortly after the settlement agreement was 
reached. R. at 647, pp. 142-143; R. at 645, pp. 28-29 (at age 6 
months Chad was already showing a delay of 1-1% months in his 
development). Thus, the one-year statute of limitation for 
fraudulent concealment long since ran by the time the Atkinsons 
filed their notice of intent to commence an action on January 8, 
1988. Even plaintiffs admit in their appellate brief that they 
discovered the alleged misrepresentations by March 3, 1986. See 
Brief of Appellants at p.60. 
Finally, even if plaintiffs discovered the alleged 
fraudulent concealment later than March 3, 1986, the four year 
statute of repose of the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act would 
bar the Atkinsons1 medical malpractice claim in the Second 
Proposed Amended Complaint. Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-4(1). This 
Court has held that the statute of repose will apply regardless 
of when discovery occurred. Sorensen v. Larsen, 740 P.2d 1336 
(Utah 1987). Additionally, it is not necessary that a plaintiff 
know the full nature, extent, severity or permanency of an 
injury to have knowledge of "legal injury" necessary to commence 
the running of the statute of limitations. Duerden v. Utah 
Valley Hospital, 663 F.Supp. 781, affirmed per curiam 876 F.2d 
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108 (10th Cir. 1989). Thus, the district court appropriately 
denied the Atkinsons' motion to amend their complaint. 
CONCLUSION 
IHC believes justice will be served if this Court 
recognizes the validity of the 1983 court approval of the 
settlement and release and affirms the dismissal of the 
complaint as to defendant IHC. Additionally, IHC believes the 
district court's granting of IHC's summary judgment was proper, 
since the complaint was barred not only by the medical 
malpractice statutes of limitations, but the statute of 
limitations for fraud or mistake, and the principles of 
collateral estoppel. Under those theories the motion to amend 
the complaint was also properly denied. And since the Atkinsons 
lacked a justiciable controversy under Count IV of their 
complaint, the district court lacked jurisdiction to resolve 
their declaratory judgment action. Defendant-Respondent IHC 
Hospitals, Inc. respectfully re< 
summary judgment by the distric 
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